Increasing the probability of paying child support, in 
I. Introduction Between 1970 and 1989 , the proportion of children living in poverty grew by nearly one third, with most of the increase attributable to the increase in single-mother families (Lerman 1993) . In response to these changes, and in an effort to compel absent fathers to provide tinancially for their children, federal and state govemment ofhcials began pursuing policies designed to strengthen child support enforcement. Not only have child support payments increased during the past 20 years (Case. Lin. and McLanahan 2003) . but income from child support appears to have beneficial effects on children over and above income from other sources (Knox and Graham, Beller, and Hernandez 1994; Knox 1996) . To account for the latter, researchers hypothesize five potential mechanisms: (1) child stipport income is more likely to be spent on children, as compared with other income; (2) child support alters family dynamics (between mothers and fathers) in a positive way; (3) child support reduces mothers" reliance on welfare and increases employment and maniage; (4) mothers invest more in their children as a signal to absent fathers of their commitment to the child in order to obtain more chiid support in the future; and finally (5) child support is positively correlated with father involvement and commitment to the child. The first four mechanisms are typically characterized as causal, while the last is considered a selection effect (Argys, Peters, Brooks-Gunn. and Smith 1998) .
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Attempts to distinguish among the hve mechanisms have been hampered by the difhculties inherent in empirically identifying the separate effects. ' We posit an alternative explanation that can be identified empirically-that stricter child support enforcement creates incentives for men to have fewer ehildren outside marriage, and for those who do, to partner with women who are more likely to invest in their children independent of child support receipt. Thus unlike previous research that posits either a causal effect or selection, we posit that stricter child support enforcement causes positive selection on the maternal quality where quality refers to a mother's own level of human capital and propensity to invest in her children. As such, we might expect current policies of stricter child support enforcement to have positive effects on both present and future child outcomes. Positive maternal selection also provides theoretical support for two of the tive previously mentioned mechanisms (that child support income is more likely to be spent on the child and that child support may reduce reliance on welfare) since higher quality mothers are more likely to invest in their children and less likely to rely on welfare.
In the (irst part of this paper we discuss the incentives generated by stricter child support enforcement policies, how they affect the fertility of single women, and how they change the average underlying characteristics of single mothers. The discussion incorporates the interaction between state policies of stricter child support enforcement and the major public program serving single women with children^the AFDC program. We predict that under certain assumptions, increasing the probability that fathers wili be required to pay child support results in (I) fewer children born to mothers who are most likely to use AFDC, and (2) more births to women with a higher underlying propensity to invest in children.
The intuition behind the first prediction is based on the fact that all child support payments received by women on welfare are taxed nearly 100 percent by the state. Thus stricter enforcement does not provide single women who are likely to rely on welfare with incentives to have children. In eontrast. stricter enforeement provides 1. Del Boca and Flinn (1994) find evidence using consumer expenditure dala that the share ol'expenditures on child g<M)ds and services increases as the share of income from child support increases amcing divorced mothers. Hernandez. Beller. and Graham ()995) identify (he impai:! of income separate trom father invulvement by comparing ihe impatl of child supfwm in a period in which lathers' coniribuiions were more likely voluniary (because ot la\ enforcement) with a period of strong enforcement in which fathers were more likely compelled (and therefore more reluctant). They find ihat as enforcement increases, the positive impact of child stipptin on education declines, suggesting ihal previous estitnates of child support relied, in pan. unobserved characteristics ol faihers who voluntarilv coniribuie. men with clear disincentives to have children, especially if their payments go to the state rather than to the tnother of their child. The intuition behind the second prediction-that stricter child support enforcement will lead to a change in the underlying composition of single women-is that, given men's inability to control how their child support dollars are spent (on the child or the mother), stronger child support enforcement provides them with an incentive to have children with women who have a greater underlying preference for investing in children.
In the second part of this paper we provide empirical support for the two predictions of the model and employ an identification strategy that enables us to isolate this particular mechanism empirically. First, we use annual data on state expenditures for chiid support enforcement and on natality for the period 1985-98 to estimate the impact of increasing the probability that fathers will have to pay child support on nonmarital chiidbearing and matemai investments in children born outside marriage.' We find that more stringent child support enforcement results in fewer births, espeeiaiiy among less educated singie women, and, conditionai on education, greater use of eariy prenatai care (a measure of the underiying propensity to invest in children), both of which suggest positive selection on matemai quality.^ By focusing on the impact of increases in state expenditures on child support enforcement that were largely driven by federal legislation (as opposed to state laws), and by using a within state difference-in-difference framework that enables us to control for factors that vary at the state-year and that might be correlated with both child support enforcement and fertility, we limit the potential for policy endogeneity bias in the findings. And because our measure of matemai investment is prenatal care that is initiated prior to the receipt of any child support, any positive impact of child support enforcement on this measure of maternal investment is unlikely related to an increase in available financial resources.
The findings that stricter child support enforcement leads to a decline in the number of out-of-wedlock births and an average incn^ase in both maternal education and child investment suggests positive selection on matemai quality as hypothesized. However, it does not rule out altemative mechanisms. Two altemative mechanisms that would give rise to similar empirical findings are (1) fathers who anticipate child support obligations in the future will (voluntarily) provide financial support to mothers during the prenatal period in order to increase mothers' own prenatal investments in the child; and (2) mothers who anticipate child support payments in the future will experience an increase in their permanent income that enables them to increase their prenatal investments by borrowing against future child support payments. These two mechanisms may be classified as income effects as opposed to a composition or selection effect.
To determine whether either of these two mechanisms is operating, we use data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a longitudinal survey of new 2. We chose 1984 as the starting year because it is the first year in which the CDC natality liles include the universe of births, not a sample. 3. These finding.'; do not support the theory proposed by Auginbaugh (2001) ihai child achievement signals a higher propensity for child investment and thus leads to an increase in future child support receipt. This theory would predict a decline in maternal prenatal investment as a result ofthe increased probabiiiiy of child support receipt as there would be less need to signal heL:ause men would be more likely to be compelled to pay child support. That is. under strict child support enforcement, women would not have to rely on voluntary support and thus would have less need to signal in order to gain support. mothers that includes infonnation on future child support, receipt of financial assistance during the prenatal period, prenatal investments (by mothers and fathers), and mothers' ability to borrow. We find that mothers who receive child suppon at Year 1 are more likely to make greater prenatal investments. However, even when we condition on prenatal financial transfers from the father, the positive impact of future child support on maternal investment in the prenatal period remains. That is, even among mothers who receive no prenatal tran.sfers, those with future child support payments are still more likely to invest in the prenatal period. This finding is inconsistent with the first mechanism-that fathers who expect to pay child support in the future will invest more during the prenatal period which enables mothers to invest more in prenatal care.
Nor do we find evidence to support lhe second mechanism-that mothers who receive child support in the futtire will invest tnore In prenatal care because they are able to borrow against future child support payments. We find no difference in the impact of future child support receipt on prenatal investment between mothers who are able to borrow and those who are not. The results from the Fragile Families data suggest that selection on fertility, rather than an income effect, is driving the finding that increases in the probability of future child support payments lead to an increase in the average probability of maternal prenatal investment in children.
Our analysis has implications for a broad range of research that examines the effect of policies on child outcomes, insofar as policies affect fertility decisions as well as subsequent parental behavior and child outcomes, failing to take account of the former may lead to incorrect estimates of the true effect of the policies.
The rest ofthe paper is laid out as follows: In Section II, we explore the incentive effeets of stricter child support enforcement and their implications in terms of potential selection on the birth mother and review the relevant literature. In Section III we discuss our identification strategy and present the results from the aggregate statelevel analysis of births from vital statistics data. In Section IV we present results from the Fragile Families analyses, which explores the mechanism(s) behind the finding that more stringent child support enforcement leads to increased prenatal investment. Section V concludes by discu.^sing the implications of our findings regarding estimation ofthe impact of child support on child wellbeing.
II, Incentive Effects of Stricter Child support enforcement A. Impact of stricter Child support enforcement on Fertility-Background Literature
Theoretical predictions of the impact of stricter child support enforcement (CSE) on the number of births or compositioti of parents are ambiguous. On the one hand, stricter CSE raises the financial obligation of the absent father to the mother, raising the cost to single fathers of having children. On the other hand, stricter CSF kwers the cost of having children faced by singie mothers. Although the former should lead to a decline in out-of-wedlock births, the latter should lead to an increase; so that the net efTect of stricter CSE on fertility is ambiguous a priori.
The empirical evidence with respect to the impact of child support enforcement on fertility suggests that the incentive effect.s of stricter CSE for men outweigh those for women: states with stricter child support enforcement have witnessed a decline in outof-wedlock births.^ These studies rely on changes in state laws governing child support enforcement (paternity establishment, immediate withholding, etc.) to idetitify the impact of stricter child support enforcement on fertility.^ Examples of this literature include Sonenstein, Pleck, and Ku (1994) who find that adolescent males are aware of paternity establishment policies and modify their sexual behavior and contraceptive use accordingly. Garfinkel and his colleagues (Garfinkel, Huang, McLanahan, and Gaylin 2003: Plotnick, Garfinkel. McLanahan, and Ku 2004) link higher paternity establishment rates to nonmaritai childbearing and find that higher paternity establishment rates reduce nonmaritai chiid. Though most of these studies employ state and year fixed effects, cndogeneity of the chiid support enforcement poiicies stiii poses a probiem if the timing of the policies within each state is driven by unobservabie characteristics related to fertility and nonmaritai childbearing that are changing over time. We address the potential policy endogenelty of stricter child support enforcement and describe our identification strategy in Section 111.
Although there is considerable empirical evidence regarding the impact of stricter CSE on fertility, there is no research on how child support affects the cotnposition or quality of parents. We provide the first such empirical estimates of the impact of stricter CSE on the composition of mothers and thus the potential quality of parenting and child outcomes.
B. Impact of Stricter Child support enforcement on Composition of Mothers
A simple model of the decision of an unmarried couple to have a child illustrates how the composition of mothers may change if chiid support enforcement increases. In such a model, fathers' utility (U^) depends on their own consumption (c^,) and the quaiity or capital of their chiidren (q). Q increases with financial resources devoted to the child-a fraction of both the mother's income (/J and any child support payments received (c.v). Fathers choose their consumption level (r,,,) and how much child support to provide (cs). Liltewise, mothers care about their own consumption {cj and q and choose how much of /", and cs to invest in the child. Some mothers invest a greater portion of their income in their children than others. We can think of these mothers as having a greater preference for chiid quality, denoted a.
4. Another pt)ssihility is thai stricter CSE is not negaiivdy affecting fertiliij', but positively affecting marriage if the cost of being ii single father increases rclalLve U> heing married, Hcim l2()()-ll finds no impiici of child suppon enforcemenl on divorce rates: Nixon (1''97) finds a negative relationship hetween child suppon enforcement and divorce as does Huang (2002) . For our purposes, however, it doesn'i mailer which mechanism is respimsihle. Though il is interesting to note thai if stricter CSE were lowering out-of-wediock hinhs by encouraging marriage (as opposed lo lowering fertihty), we would expect those marrying to come Irom the upper lail of the distribution of "quality" single mothers-that is. mothers with higher education. As such, the underlying quality/education of single mothers woulJ decline. Thai is not what we find, suggesting that stricter child suppon enforcement in not alfecting the composition of single mothers hy increasing the incentives for marriage. 5. There also exists a literature linking increased child support enforcement with child support payments (Freeman and Waldtogel 199H; Argys, Peters, and Waldman 1995; Nixon 1994; Miller. Garlinkel, and McLanahan 1997; Betler and Graham 1991) .
Although a noncohabitating father is unabie to ensure that ail child support payments to the mother arc spent on the child and not on her own consumption (Wiliis 1999), he may observe a mother's a. Because a determines how much of her income and child support she will invest in her child, men always wiii prefer to have children with women with a greater a.
When deciding whether to have a child, a man wiil compare the indirect utiiity gained from not having a chiid (income spent on his consumption only) and having a child with a woman with a given a (income spent on consumption and child support), Acriticai ievel of a exists above which his utiiity from having a chiid exceeds that of not having tjne. This critical ievel increases with the probabiiity that he wiil be forced to pay child support and with the probability that the woman will rely on welfare (AFDC/TANF). The intuition behind the iatter is that, with some exceptions (some states aliow for a S.'O pass through each month), most child support payments to mothers on welfare are taxed 100 percent by the state. As such, men receive littie if any additionai benefit (in the form of higher chiid quality) from their child support payments if the mother relies on welfare.** Thus when forced to pay child support, men wili want to have chiidren with women with a greater a and when women are iikeiy to use weifare, men wili require an even higher a to have a chiid with her. Figure 1 illustrates these points, in the figure, the horizontai line U^ (AT) represents a father's utiiity associated with not havitig a chiid (NC). Utility does not change with a because it is only a function of income (/,"). The dark iine UJC, NE) represents a father's utility from having a child with no child support enforcement, and the line UjC, E) represents his utiiity from having a chiid with chiid support enforcement, a*vt represents the minimum a required for the utiiity of having a chiid to exceed that of not having one ((/,,,(C, NE)> UJNC)) under no enforcement. As is evident from the graph, this critical value is iower than that under enforcement a* vf < a*^. The intuition behind this is simpiy that the constraint introduced by child support enforcement (if it is binding) lowers a father's utility ibr any given a. The fourth iine ((/," {C,E,W)) represents the indirect utility associated with having a child with a woman on welfare under a regime of strict chiid support enforcement. The criticai vaiue a*fn, above which men will choose to have chiidren. is higher stiii.
III. Child support enforcement. Prenatal Investments and Birth Outcomes: Evideuce from Vital Statistics Data
Our analysis of the impact of stricter child support enforcement on birth rates, prenatal investment and birth outcomes differs in important ways from previous research. Previous studies have examined the impact of state child support poiicies on the nutnber of births among single tiiothers (Case 1998 ; Garfinkel. Huang,
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McLanahan. and Gaylin 2003). We are the first to examine the impact of stricter child support enforcement on the composition/quahty of mothers (as measured by tbeir educational attainment) and the prenatal investments they make in their children as measured by their early initiation of prenatal care and number of prenatal visits.
Another important distinction lies in our empirical methods. A major challenge of estimating Ihe impact of stricter child support enforcement on fertility and maternal investment is to identify the effect of child support enforcement separate from other potentially unobservable factors that might affect both the state's child support policies and fertility or investment in children. Previous studies of the impact of child support enforcement policies on fertility attempt to control for unobserved influences using a variety of methods. Most compar;; changes in fertility over time between states that adopt stricter child support enforcement and those that do not (also referred to as a state fixed effect approach). This provides some control for policy endogeneity by controlling for state-level factors that are fixed and do not vary over time, but not factors that might vary within state over time.^ ln this paper we adopt an alternative approach that controls for time-varying unobservable factors within a state that 7. Case (1998) is a notable exception. She fxpliL-itly lecognizes this possibility in her invesligalion of ihe impuc! of laws establlshitig stricter child support ctitbrcement on the number of otii-of-wedlock births. In a simple OLS, she iinds ihat the laws predict iin increase iti oti(-ot-wedlock bitlhs. After instrumenting !br the state laws using churacieristies of the Male legislalurcs. she finds ihat stricter child support enforcement does lead to a decline in t)ut-of-wedlock births, though ihe results are not significant. Her results underscore the importance of controlling for policy endogencity. might affecl child support enforcement and fertility/investment. Examples of such factors might include changes in society values and norms or changes in the availability and cost of contraception.
To do this we obtain within state difference-in-differences estimates ofthe effect of stricter child support enforcement. This estimate is obtained by defining two groups: a treatment or experimental group and a control group. Because state child support enforcement expenditures target single women, we define single women as the treatment and married women as the control group. We therefore construct our estimates ofthe impact of stricter child support enforcement by comparing its impact on the fertility/investment decisions of single mothers relative to married mothers residing in the same state. The assumption of this identification strategy is that changes over time in the behavior of men and women that are unrelated to child support enforcement are common to single and married women. It also assumes that married women are unaffected by child support enforcement. While this assumption is restrictive, it is preferable to simply comparing fertility/investment decisions under strict child support enforcement regimes with those under more lenient regimes because it allows one to identify the effect of stricter child support enforcement separate from broader changes in social norms, the cost of investing in children or other factors as measured by the behavior of married women.
Because these single-married fertility/investment differentials can be computed within cells defined by state and year, our approach implicitly controls for all timevarying state specific factors by allowing us to include not only individual state and year fixed effects buy state*year fixed effects (as discussed further in the next section). The stale*year fixed effects subsume the individual state and year main effects so that they need not be included separately. In other words, the vector of .siate*year fixed effects includes individual state and year fixed effects as well as an interaction between them.
A. Data and Estimation
Data on all births in the United States come from the 1985-99 Natality Detail Files collected by the CDC.*^ Summary statistics are provided in Appendix Tables AI and  A2 . Rather than perform the analysis on a data set of all individual births, we aggregated the data to the group level with groups defined by year, state, age group, race, education, and marital status.'' We matched these data with data on child support enforcement by the year in which the child was conceived (calculated using gestationa! age and date of birth). Our measure of child support enforcement is expenditures on child support that come from the annual reports ofthe Office of Child support enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. This represents a departure from other work that has focused on either specific policies/laws with respect to child support enforcement and/or child support expenditures. We focus on 8. Beginning in I9H5. ull births were included as part of the tile. Prior to 1985. only a random sample of binhs were included lor some states. The linal dafy sei Includes all births conceived 1985-98. However, we needed to use nataliiy data friim 1999 lo calculate ihe lotal number of cbildren (bai were conceived in 1998. 9. An example of a single group or cell would be all births lo single while moibcrs age 20-29 in Montana in 1990. expenditures for the following reasons: (1) Previous work has found the data on child support policies to be "incomplete and in some places inconsistent" (Freeman and Waldlogel 1998); and (2) multiple policies and laws require selection of an arguably arbitrary subset. However, we do repeat the analysis with a single policy-whether child support is withheld from father's wages; we discuss those results in the following section.
The equation estimated takes the form:
(I) y»mra.-= P/ siugle,,, + % \niCSE)*single,,,^,.^ + p, Race, + p^ Education, + P5 Age,, + pft state*yearly., + e,,,,,,,,Î n the above equation CS£ refers to the average annuai expenditures in the state in the three years prior to the year of conception. We do this because we believe that the effects of increased child support enforcement are not immediate but are lagged, and also to further limit the potential for policy-endogeneity bias. Single is an indicator equal to one if the birth mother is single (representing the treatment group). Thus the coefficient on the term \nCSE*single{^2^ represents the within-state difference in-differences estimate: the impact of the child support enforcement on single women relative to married women in states that experience large increases in CSE relative to those in states with small changes in CSE. The vector Race includes the dummy variables for the race ofthe mother (black, white. Hispanic. Asian, and other is the omitted group), the vector Age includes dummies for the age of the mother (teen, age 2(}-29, age 30-39. and age 40-5,*^ is the omitted group) and Education include.s the educational status of the mother (less than HS, HS. HS+). For this analysi.s. we dropped college-educated mothers as single college educated mothers are quite rare and unrepresentative. Recall that because the data are aggregated to the eell level based on state, year. race, marital status, age. and education, only binary indicators for these measures, not continuous variables, cai be inciuded.
As noted previously, the inclusion of state*year fixed effects subsumes individual state and year fixed effects, so they are not included separately in the analysis (in other words, they are included in the state*year fixed effects)."^ Including state*year fixed effects also controls for all factors that may vary within states ovev time, such as unemployment rates and AFDC benefits that may be correlated with both the state's child support policies and birth outcomes as well as any other factors that vary within state over time that affect the whole population." In addition, the vector of state*year fixed effects subsumes the main CSE term (since it varies by state and year) but not the term ]n(CSE)* single-enabling identification ofthe impact of CSE on birth outcomes.
The outcomes (K) are the (I) log ol' the number of births. (2) the proportion of mothers in the cell who initiated prenatal care in the first trimester, (3) the average number of prenatal visits, and (4) the proportion of low birth weight (LBW) births.
10. State^year fixed effects include individual state and year fixed effects. This is can be shown with the following short example. Consider two years and two stales. If slate*year fixed effects are included, ihere would he three dummies included: ,v(«(c/*mir/, state I'^yearl and stttte2*year! {stute2*year2 is theomiited or relerenue category i which is lhe equivalent of two main effi;cts and an interaction (we are grateful to the ediior for suggesting this illustrative example]. \ 1. Expan.sions in the Medicaid program represent a change in policy lhat might he of particular concern with respect to itnprovenient in birth outcomes over this period. Since Medicaid expansions were all implemenfed by 1486 we run the regressions a second time for the period 1987-98 and get the same results.
For the first of these, we also include the log ofthe number of women in the cell (the denominator) as a covariate and weight by the size of the denominator.'-For the second, third, and fourth we weight by the number of births in the cell.
B. Results
Estimates of the impact of CSE on the number of births are presented in Table I . The tirst column displays estimates of the impact of stricter CSE on the number of births. Consistent with previous work, we find that stricter child support enforcement leads to a significant decline in births to single women relative to married women. The estimated coefficient ^^ (-0.033) can be interpreted as the elasticity of the birth rate with respect to changes in child support expenditures. That is, a I percent increase in expenditures leads to a decline in single (nonmaritai) fertility relative to marital fertility of 0.03 percent. In the next three columns of Table I . we examine whether stricter C5£ differentially affects the fertility of some single women more than others, thereby potentially altering the average underlying characteristics of single mothers and their children. We previously predicted that the fertility of those single mothers most likely to use the AFDC program would decline relative to others. Though we do not have an exact measure of a woman's propensity to use welfare, we do have measures of maternal education, which is highly negatively correlated with welfare use. In Columns 2-4 we present the results stratified by maternal education. Consistent with our prediction, stricter CSE appears to have the greatest negative impact on the fertility of the women who have the least education and therefore are most likely lo use welfare. The estimated elasticity is -0.094 for women without a high school degree and -0.039 for women with a high school degree. In contrast, for women with some college, the elasticity is slightly positive (0.023).
In Table 2 we present esti tiiates of the impact of stricter CSE on two measures of prenatal investments of mothers-early initiation of prenatal care and the number of prenatal visits. Column 1 presents estimates of the impact of increasing child support expenditures on the proportion of single mothers in the state that initiate care in the first trimester, controlling for age, education and race. We find that single women in states with stricter child support enforcement are more likely to initiate care in the first trimester. Over the period 1984-98, the share of single women initiating care in the first trimester increased from 0.548 to 0.708 (see Appendix Table 2 ). Given that CS'E increased on average 300 percent over this period, the estimated coefficient of 0.018 suggests that half of this increase can be attributed to the increase in child support enforcement.'^ Similarly in Column 2 we present results which suggest that the increase in child support enforcement also led to a positive and significant increase in the number of prenatal visits among single women and was responsible for 6 percent of the observed increase in prenatal visits over this period. Finally, in Column 3. we present results for LBW. The proportion of single 12. The detiominator (the tiumher of women of a given race, education level, age and marital status in a given state) was calculated from the 1990 Census. 13. We tihtain this hy estimating the impact of the average increase in child support expenditures 1984-98 (roughly .100 percent) on the increase in prenatal care as a percent of the total increase in prenatal care observed over this period. women with LBW babies declined from 0.112 to 0.099 over this period. The results suggest that the increase in child support enforcement over this period explains 13 percent ofthis decline.
In Table 3 . we present estimates of the impact of stricter child support enforcement on fertility, prenatal investment, and birth outcomes stratified by race. For nonblack mothers (Columns 1^). increasing expenditures on child support leads to a reduction in the number of births, an increase in the proportion of women initiating early prenatal care and the number of visits, and a decline in the proportion of LBW births. For black mothers, however, while the number of births decline and the proportion initiating prenatal care early increases as does the number of prenatal visits. Number Of Visits birth outcomes do not appear to improve. For black mothers, we find no significant effect of child support enforcement on LBW.
To provide additional evidence in support of this finding, we also estimate a discrete time duration model ofthe impact of CSE on time until first birth, using data on individual women from the NLSY79. The NLSY79 consists of a nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women age 14-22 in 1979 interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and then biennially until 2000. The NLSY includes 6,283 women of whom 5.762 are included in this analysis (521 are excluded because they already had at least one child by 1979). Individual data allow us to include additional 00 OS
controls that might affect fertility such as AFQT score (the score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Exam, a measure of cognitive ability), whether her mother worked when she was 14 years old, and the highest grade completed by her mother. Though sample sizes prevent us from obtaining precise estimates, the hazard models do suggest that the probability that single women wiil have a child in a given year, conditional on not having had a child to date, is lower in states that spend more on child support enforcement. Increasing expenditures on child support enforcement two standard deviations around the mean decreases the probability of birth for a single woman from 4.5 to 1.7 percent.'•" We also tind that though the likelihood ai' having a child decreases for single women when child support enforcement increases, it does so at a slower rate for those with more education. This is consistent with our findings based on aggregate birth certificate data: stricter child support enforcement has the greatest negative impact on the fertility of women most likely to use AFDC-those with the least education.
Our choice of expenditures as the measure of child support enforcement is subject to the criticism that it might be confounded with efficiency or with the difficulty of the caseload of delinquent fathers. If, for example, expenditures were confounded with efliciency-^that is. greater expenditures in states with less efficient child support collection systems-then the results would be biased downward. Similarly, if expenditures were confounded with caseload difficulty (that is, states that increase their expenditures are those that already collect from those least reluctant to contribute and are attempting to collect child support from more reluctant fathers), thi.s might also bias our estimates downward. On the other hand, if states with more efficient or less difficult caseloads spend more because the marginal benefit of expenditures is greater, then our results would be biased upward.
As a check, we estimate the impact of an alternative measure of child support enforcement-an indicator for enactment of a law that automatically withholds child support payments from the wages of absent fathers. While the withhold represents an alternative measure, it is stili positively correlated with child support expenditures (as are other child support iaws). We tind that, for example, adoption of [he automatic withhold would explain 36 percent of the increase in first trimester prenatal care (less than the 50 percent explained by the increase in child support enforcement expenditures). While the results are qualitatively similar, they suggest a possible small upward bias to the results based on child support expenditures.
IV. Child support and Prenatal Investments: Evidence from the Fragile Families Study
In this section we investigate potential mechanisms behind otir finding that increased child support enforcement leads to an increase in prenatal investment. In particular, we wish to know whether this increase is due to positive .selection as we hypothesize or some alternative mechanism. Two possibie alternative mechanisms include: (I) increases in paternal income transfers during the prenatal period (in 14. Results Livailabic upon requeM from the authors.
anticipation of future support obligations); and (2) increases in mother's ability to borrow against future child support payments dtiring the prenatal period (as a result of a positive permanent income effect). We use data from the Fragile Families Study to determine to what extent the increase may be attributed to either of these two alternative mechanisms. Lack of evidence for either of these mechanisms would provide yet further support for our hypothesis of positive selection.
A. The Fragile Families Data
The Fragile Famiiies and Child Well Being Study interviews approximately 3.7(X) new unwed couples residing in 20 cities in i5 states shortly after the birth of their child. Parents are interviewed again when the child is between 12 and 18 months old. About 1,900 of these parents were not cohabiting at the time of the follow-up interview and therefore were eligible for child support and inclusion in our sample. A unique aspect of the Fragile Families data is the extensive information (taken from both maternai and paternal surveys) on noncohabiting fathers.
These data inciude information on whetlier a formai or informal child support agreement exists at 12-18 months (34 percent). These data also include information on child investments during the prenatal period: the date when the mother initiated prenatal care and whether the father provided financial assistance to her during this period. Lastly, the data contain information on whether the mothers can borrow money (at least $2(X)) if they need to-a measure of their credit constraint.
B. Results from Fragile Families
In the first two columns of Table 4 we present evidence regarding the impact of future child support receipt and prenatal transfers on prenatal investments. In the first column we explore the relationship between future child support receipt and eariy initiation of prenatai care. We find that those mothers who receive future child support are more likely to initiate prenatal care early (0.085). as expected. Even when we control for whether prenatal transfers were received from the father in Column 2, the positive effect of future child support receipt remains (0.080), suggesting that the receipt of prenatal transfers cannot explain the positive impact of future child support receipt on prenatai investments. In results not presented, we find that the same pattern emerges for LBW: Future child support receipt leads to a decline in LBW and the effect remains e\en when we controi for prenatai transfers, but the effects are impreciseiy estimated, most iiicely due to small sampie sizes.
To rule out the possibility that in anticipation of future chiid support payments, mothers are able to borrow additional money during the prenatai period (a permanent income effect), we stratify the sample based on whether the mother is credit constrained using the above-mentioned measure of credit constraint. The results are presented in Columns 3 and 4. If it were the case that future child support receipt positively affects maternal prenatal investment because the mother is able to borrow against future child support payments, then the positive impact of future child support receipt would be limited to (or at least stronger for) mothers who are not credit con- 
V. Discussion
This paper is the first to examine hovv' the composition of mothers changes in response to an increase in the probability of future child support payments brought about by stricter state child support enforcement. We find that the average education of mothers increases, as does the level of maternal investments in children (as measured by early investment in prenata] care), with stronger child support enforcement. What is notable about these lesults is that the increase in maternal investment occurs prior to the receipt of any child support payments, suggesting that stricter child support enforcement, in addition to increasing the material resources available to children, may benefit children through a birth selection process. That is. stricter child support enforcement reduces fenility, especially among mothers who are less likely to invest in their children, regardless of actual child support receipt. As a result, we might expect current policies of child support enforcement to affect both current and future child outcomes. Existing research on the impact of child support receipt on child outcomes has not considered this mechanism. To fully understand the impact of any changes in state policies affecting child support enforcement on child outcomes, it is necessary to understand how policies might affect both the birth selection process as well as the receipt of financial resources, conditional on the birth of the child. 
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